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PROSECUTORIAL ETHICS: THE CASE
FOR THE PER SE RULE
I. Introduction
The integrity of the legal system is essential to public confidence in
government.' Without public confidence, the rule of law loses its
meaning.2 The prosecutor is often the most visible participant in the
criminal justice system, and thus, even the appearance of impropriety
in the prosecutor's behavior erodes the public trust.3 He has a duty to
seek justice and truth, not only to convict.' This duty creates a dual
role for the prosecutor: he is both an advocate seeking to obtain con-
victions and a minister of justice attempting to discover the truth.'
The public expects him to fulfill these functions to the best of his abil-
ity and to act fairly in executing all of his responsibilities.
There are, however, instances where the prosecutor's conduct pre-
vents a fair trial. This Note will discuss the ethical problems faced by
the prosecutor who litigates both civil and criminal cases arising out
of the same dispute or set of facts. These ethical issues arise in two
situations: where the prosecutor's prior private practice conflicts with
his current position or where the prosecutor simultaneously maintains
a private practice that conflicts with his position as prosecutor. 6 In
either situation, the prosecutor confronts ethical considerations bear-
1. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 9-1 (1980) [hereinafter
MODEL CODE]. "'Integrity is the very breath of justice. Confidence in our law, our
courts, and in the administration of justice is our supreme interest. No practice must be
permitted to prevail which invites towards the administration of justice a doubt or dis-
trust of its integrity.'" MODEL CODE EC 9-1 n.1 (quoting Erwin M. Jennings Co. v.
DiGenova, 107 Conn. 491, 499, 141 A. 866, 868 (1928)).
2. "Because of his position in society, even minor violations of law by a lawyer may
tend to lessen public confidence in the legal profession. Obedience to law exemplifies
respect for law. To lawyers especially, respect for the law should be more than a plati-
tude." MODEL CODE, supra note 1, EC 1-5.
3. United States v. Prantil, 764 F.2d 548, 553 (9th Cir. 1985); United States v. John-
ston, 690 F.2d 638, 643 (7th Cir. 1982) (en banc). See also Carey, The Role of the Prosecu-
tor in a Free Society, 12 CRIM. L. BULL. 317, 319 (1976) [hereinafter Carey]; Felkenes,
The Prosecutor: A Look at Reality, 7 Sw. U.L. REV. 98 (1975) [hereinafter Felkenes].
4. D. NISSMAN, THE PROSECUTION FUNCTION 7 (1982) [hereinafter PROSECUTION
FUNCTION]; Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935).
5. Fisher, In Search of the Virtuous Prosecutor: A Conceptual Framework, 15 AM. J.
CRIM. L. 197, 198 (1988) [hereinafter Virtuous Prosecutor].
6. Not all state prosecutors work as full time prosecutors. In New York, for exam-
ple, if a county has fewer than forty thousand inhabitants, the prosecutor does not have
to work full-time; he can maintain a private practice. N.Y. COUNTY LAW § 700(8) (Mc-
Kinney 1989). See also STANDARDS RELATING TO THE PROSECUTION FUNCTION AND
THE DEFENSE FUNCTION at 58-60 (ABA Project on Standards for Criminal Justice, Ap-
proved Draft 1971) [hereinafter PROSECUTION STANDARDS].
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ing directly on his impartial role as minister of justice. Part II of this
Note discusses the obligations of the prosecutor and the professional
standards that govern his conduct. Part III examines some of the
factors that can generate prosecutorial misconduct, and Part IV
presents the case law governing such ethical dilemmas. Part V con-
siders the shortcomings in the present case law and argues that the
existing law inadequately deters unethical behavior. In order to deter
unethical behavior, Part VI recommends the adoption of a "per se"
rule, which would prohibit a prosecutor's involvement in criminal
cases that overlap with cases from their private practices.
II. Obligations of the Prosecutor
A. Professional Standards
The American Bar Association (ABA) has issued two sets of rules
governing the professional conduct of lawyers. The first was the 1969
Model Code of Professional Responsibility (the Model Code),' articu-
lating the norms within which a lawyer was supposed to function.
Within a few years, courts of a large majority of jurisdictions adopted
the Model Code.9 There have been subsequent amendments dealing
largely with advertising and prepaid legal services.' 0
The Model Code, however, was not especially helpful when a law-
yer faced a particular situation because it offered no guidance on how
the norms should be applied. Furthermore, as the practice of law be-
came increasingly complex, several deficiencies in the Model Code be-
came apparent."' First, it did not take into account the roles, such as
advisor or mediator, that a lawyer may play in contexts other than
litigation.' 2 Second, it did not recognize the development of both law
firms and clients into complex organizations and thus failed to deal
7. See infra notes 71-105 and accompanying text.
8. MODEL CODE, supra note 1, Preliminary Statement, at 1. There are three sepa-
rate but interrelated parts in the Model Code: the Canons, the Ethical Considerations
(EC) and the Disciplinary Rules (DR). Each section has its own purpose. The canons
express, in general terms, the standards of conduct expected of lawyers in their dealings
with the public. The ethical considerations represent objectives towards which members
of the legal community should aspire. The disciplinary rules are mandatory. They state
the minimum level of conduct required of a lawyer; below that level, a lawyer can be
subject to disciplinary action. Id.
9. G. HAZARD & W. HODES, THE LAW OF LAWYERING: A HANDBOOK ON THE
MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT xxxiv (1985 & Supp. 1989) [hereinafter
HAZARD].
10. Id.
11. Id. at xxxv.
12. Id.
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adequately with the complex issues involved in conflicts.1 3 The struc-
ture of the Model Code also presented problems because, although
only its Disciplinary Rules were supposed to be binding, in practice,
lawyers were often only held to the standards expressed in the Canons
and Ethical Considerations.1 4
In 1977, the ABA appointed the Special Commission on Evaluation
of Professional Standards (the Kutak Commission) to examine the
Model Code's problems and to determine whether it should be modi-
fied or replaced.15 The Kutak Commission recommended a complete
revision of the Model Code, putting it into a restatement format with
black letter rules and comments following.16 After much debate and
redrafting, in August 1983, the ABA formally adopted the Model
Rules of Professional Conduct (Model Rules). 17
The Model Rules are organized around two main categories: rules
governing the conduct of a law practice and those governing ancillary
legal elements of lawyering.18 The Model Rules are better integrated
than is the Model Code because they take a functional approach to
the problems that arise in law practice."9 The Model Rules also deal
explicitly with the varied roles of lawyers, such as advocate or coun-
selor, that lawyers perform.20
Once the ABA adopted the Model Rules, they were submitted to
the states for consideration. The states could adopt, modify or reject
the Model Rules; thus far, many states have formally adopted them,
although in some instances with significant modifications.2'
The American Bar Association issued the Model Code of Profes-
sional Responsibility to delineate "fundamental ethical principles" to
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Id. at xxxviii.
18. Id.
19. Id. at xxxviii.l.
20. Id.
21. In New York, adoption of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct was particu-
larly drawn out, with an amended version being adopted recently to go into effect on
September 1, 1990. 203 N.Y.L.J. 92, S1 (Supp. 1990). This was the first major overhaul
of the Professional Responsibility Code since 1969. Id. The New York State Bar had
proposed several amendments to the four appellate division departments, and, on April 5,
the appellate division departments issued a joint report incorporating some of those rec-
ommendations. Id. The justices also added some provisions of their own to the joint
report. Id. The process was lengthy largely because of a conflict over whether an attor-
ney's duty to his client should prevail over all other duties, such as telling the court when
perjury had been committed. Id. These disputes were largely resolved in favor of the
attorney's obligation of confidentiality to his client. Id.
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guide lawyers. 22 According to Ethical Consideration 5-1, nothing
should interfere with the exercise of a lawyer's professional judgment
for his client's benefit.2" The Model Code notes that a lawyer is al-
ways under a dual obligation: his obligation to his client and his obli-
gation to the legal system.24 These responsibilities apply equally to a
lawyer in private practice or to a public prosecutor. 25 Ethical Consid-
erations 7-13 and 7-14 deal specifically with prosecutors. Ethical
Consideration 7-13, in particular, recognizes that the prosecutor's
duty is to seek justice rather than simply to convict.26 Thus, he is not
in the position of the usual advocate; it is the dual role within the
system which puts additional burdens on the prosecutor.27 The
Model Code also requires the prosecutor to disclose evidence that
tends to mitigate or negate the guilt of the defendant.2" In addition,
the prosecutor is not to file charges against a defendant where there is
no probable cause to support the charges.29
The Model Code's provisions dealing with conflicts are generally
vague. There is a strong emphasis on preserving the client's confi-
22. MODEL CODE, supra note 1, Preamble.
23. MODEL CODE, supra note 1, EC 5-1. It states:
[t]he professional judgment of a lawyer should be exercised, within the bounds
of the law, solely for the benefit of his client and free of compromising influ-
ences and loyalties. Neither his personal interests, the interests of other clients,
nor the desires of third persons should be permitted to dilute his loyalty to his
client.
24. MODEL CODE, supra note 1, EC 7-1.
25. The Model Code focuses primarily on the ethical obligations of an attorney in
private practice. Some sections deal with issues and conflicts faced by a government
attorney who returns to private practice. See, e.g., MODEL CODE, supra note 1, EC 9-3,
DR 9-101(B); MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.11 (1983) [hereinaf-
ter MODEL RULES]. There are also some sections that discuss the prosecutor's role
within the judicial system. See, e.g., MODEL CODE, supra note 1, ECs 7-13, 7-14, DR 7-
103.
26. MODEL CODE, supra note 1, EC 7-13.
27. Id.
[The prosecutor is]... the representative not of an ordinary party to a contro-
versy, but of a sovereignty whose obligation to govern impartially is as compel-
ling as its obligation to govern at all; and whose interest, therefore, in a criminal
prosecution is not that it shall win a case, but that justice shall be done. As
such, he is in a peculiar and very definite sense the servant of the law, the two-
fold aim of which is that guilt not escape nor innocence suffer. He may prose-
cute with earnestness and vigor-indeed, he should do so. But, while he may
strike hard blows, he is not at liberty to strike foul ones. It is as much his duty
to refrain from improper methods calculated to produce a wrongful conviction
as it is to use every legitimate means to bring about a just one.
Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935).
28. MODEL CODE, supra note 1, DR 7-103(B). The MODEL RULES, supra note 25,
has a similar provision. See infra notes 41-42 and accompanying text.
29. MODEL CODE, supra note 1, DR 7-103(A).
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dences and secrets.3" This obligation continues after the termination
of the attorney-client relationship. 3' Canon Five stresses the need for
a lawyer to exercise his independent professional judgment for the
benefit of his client. Several of the Canon Five ethical considerations
deal with the interests of multiple clients.32 A lawyer is to avoid any
employment that would adversely affect his judgment with respect to
a client.33 Ethical Consideration 5-15 enunciates some of the ele-
ments he should weigh, although they are not too precise.34
The Model Code does not specifically deal with a conflict that
arises out of the prosecutor's simultaneous government and private
practice. Ethical Consideration 7-14 indicates that a government law-
yer should not initiate litigation which he knows is unfair, and that he
should not use litigation to bring about unjust results."5 In addition,
Canon Nine admonishes a lawyer to "avoid even the appearance of
professional impropriety. ' 36 The ethical considerations accompany-
ing Canon Nine express particular concern for actions that are not
illegal but, because the actions might appear unethical to a lay person,
undermine the judicial system as a whole."
Under the Model Rules, there are five requirements imposed on a
prosecutor governing the conduct of a trial.38 These include, for ex-
ample, refraining from prosecuting a charge that is unsupported by
probable cause, as well as disclosing any evidence that either mitigates
or negates the defendant's guilt.39 The rule in essence reiterates the
prosecutor's constitutional obligations to the accused, but it is broader
in scope.' Under Brady v. Maryland 41 only material exculpatory evi-
dence must be disclosed.42
The Model Rules have some precise statements governing conflicts
among clients and with former clients, and different tests apply in the
30. See MODEL CODE, supra note 1, ECs 4-1, 4-2, 4-5, DR 4-101(B).
31. MODEL CODE, supra note 1, EC 4-6.
32. See, e.g., MODEL CODE, supra note 1, ECs 5-14, 5-15, 5-16.
33. MODEL CODE, supra note 1, EC 5-14.
34. See MODEL CODE, supra note 1, EC 5-15. Some of the elements that are to be
considered include whether his judgment would be impaired, how great the differing in-
terests are likely to be and whether his loyalty will be divided. Id.
35. MODEL CODE, supra note 1, EC 7-14.
36. MODEL CODE, supra note 1, Canon 9.
37. See MODEL CODE, supra note 1, ECs 9-1, 9-2, 9-6.
38. See MODEL RULES, supra note 25, Rule 3.8. See also supra notes 26-29 and ac-
companying text.
39. MODEL RULES, supra note 25, Rule 3.8(a), (d).
40. See supra note 27 and accompanying text.
41. 373 U.S. 83 (1963).
42. Id. at 87 (emphasis added).
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two cases.43 There are two primary concerns in both instances: pro-
tecting the confidences of the client and protecting the attorney's duty
of loyalty.44 For example, Rule 1.9 of the Model Rules indicates that
a lawyer shall not, after representing a client in a matter, use any
information obtained in that representation to the disadvantage of a
former client. 45 With concurrent conflicts, a stricter test is employed.
If the representation is directly adverse to another client, the attorney
cannot represent the second client unless two conditions are met."
The first is that the lawyer must reasonably believe that the represen-
tation will not adversely affect the relationship with the other client.47
The second is that both clients consent, after being fully informed of
the conflict and attendant risks.48
With successive conflicts, the test is somewhat less restrictive. Rule
1.9 employs a "substantially related" standard to determine whether
the attorney can accept the second representation.49 The substantial
relationship test was first articulated in T C. Theatre Corp. v. Warner
Bros. Pictures, Inc. 50 The Southern District of New York put it in the
following terms: "the former client need show no more than that the
matter embraced within the pending suit wherein his former attorney
appears on behalf of his adversary is substantially related to the mat-
ters or cause of action wherein the attorney previously represented
him."5
The substantial relationship test has been applied in many different
cases. 2 Courts look at both the issues and the facts to determine
whether the cases are sufficiently similar for the attorney to be dis-
qualified. The primary purpose of the rule is to protect all the dimen-
sions of the professional relationship between the attorney and his
client, especially the confidences and secrets that the client has dis-
closed. 3 Courts have expressed concern in these cases about clients'
being able to expect the attorney's undivided loyalty.54 The two ca-
43. See, e.g., MODEL RULES, supra note 25, Rules 1.7, 1.9, 1.10.
44. See MODEL RULES, supra note 25, Rules 1.7 comment, 1.9 comment.
45. See MODEL RULES, supra note 25, Rule 1.9(b).
46. MODEL RULES, supra note 25, Rule 1.7(a).
47. MODEL RULES, supra note 25, Rule 1.7(a)(1).
48. MODEL RULES, supra note 25, Rule 1.7(a)(2).
49. See MODEL RULES, supra note 25, Rule 1.9(a).
50. 113 F. Supp. 265 (S.D.N.Y. 1953).
51. Id. at 268.
52. See generally Trone v. Smith, 621 F.2d 994 (9th Cir. 1980); Fund of Funds, Ltd.
v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 567 F.2d 225 (2d Cir. 1977); United States v. Standard Oil
Co., 136 F. Supp. 345 (S.D.N.Y. 1955).
53. Trone v. Smith, 621 F.2d 994, 998 (9th Cir. 1980).
54. See Fund of Funds, Ltd. v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 567 F.2d 225, 232-33 (2d
Cir. 1977).
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nons of the Code most often invoked are Canon Four, which requires
an attorney to maintain his client's confidences, and Canon Five,
which requires an attorney to exercise his independent professional
judgment on behalf of his client."
The substantial relationship test does not automatically apply sim-
ply because two cases arise out of the same general event. In Unified
Sewerage Agency v. Jelco Inc.,56 the same law firm represented the
contractor in a dispute with the electrical contractor and also repre-
sented another subcontractor in a dispute with the contractor." The
court held that there had been informed consent on the part of the
contractor.5 8 In addition, the court concluded that, although both ac-
tions arose out of the same construction project, each was its own
distinct, non-overlapping cause of action and disqualification was not
required. 9
There is no easy method of determining in advance whether a court
will decide that the attorney should be disqualified under the substan-
tial relationship test.' Indeed, some cases, such as Unified Sewerage
Agency v. Jelco Inc.,61 would at first seem to require disqualification,
although that is not what the court decided. A concern with the at-
torney's being in a position where he could breach his client's confi-
dences, thereby violating his duty of loyalty to his client, underlies all
the decisions.62
B. The Prosecutor's Obligations
The prosecutor performs a unique function in the criminal justice
system.63 The government he represents has an obligation to govern
impartially; this obligation imposes a fundamental duty on the prose-
cutor to seek justice rather than simply to seek convictions. 64 As a
servant of the law, the prosecutor's obligation is twofold: to ensure
55. See, e.g., id. at 234-35.
56. 646 F.2d 1339 (9th Cir. 1981).
57. Id. at 1342-43.
58. Id. at 1346.
59. Id. at 1351.
60. See, e.g., Evans v. Artek Systems Corp., 715 F.2d 788 (2d Cir. 1983); Hull v.
Celanese Corp., 513 F.2d 568 (2d Cir. 1975); United States v. Standard Oil Co., 136 F.
Supp. 345 (S.D.N.Y. 1955).
61. 646 F.2d 1339 (9th Cir. 1981).
62. Trone v. Smith, 621 F.2d 994, 998 (9th Cir. 1980).
63. ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS IN PROSECUTION 1 (John J. Douglass ed. 1977)
[hereinafter ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS]. See also PROSECUTION FUNCTION, supra note
4, at 7.
64. PROSECUTION FUNCTION, supra note 4, at 7. See also MODEL CODE, supra note
1, EC 7-13; Carey, supra note 3, at 319.
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that criminal- behavior is punished and to protect a defendant's
rights.6 5 Thus, the prosecutor must refrain from wrongful conduct
designed to secure an unjust conviction while, at the same time, using
every legal means to secure a just one.66 There are, therefore, two
conflicting forces pulling on the prosecutor: the obligation to protect
the rights of the accused, and the obligation to enforce the rights of
the public to be free from crime.67
The prosecutor represents all the people within his jurisdiction, and
yet he owes a certain responsibility to those accused of crimes.6 This
responsibility to the accused is rooted in the nature of the American
criminal justice system as demonstrated by the constitutional protec-
tions of the rights of the criminally accused.69 Some of the protec-
tions include the prosecutor's obligations to turn over to the accused
65. PROSECUTION FUNCTION, supra note 4, at 2.
66. Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935). See also supra note 27.
67. Thompson v. State, 163 Ga. App. 35, '36, 292 S.E.2d 470, 471 (1982). See also
Carey, supra note 3, at 320.
68. 163 Ga. App. at 36, 292 S.E.2d at 471. The prosecutor has a duty to disclose
"evidence ... that tends to negate the guilt of the accused, mitigate the degree of the
offense, or reduce the punishment." MODEL CODE, supra note 1, EC 7-13. DR 7-103 is
in accord. MODEL CODE, supra note 1. In Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963),
the Court held that where a prosecutor withholds material evidence favorable to the ac-
cused, due process is violated. The prosecutor's good or bad faith is irrelevant in making
the due process determination. Id. Thus, the ethical and constitutional standards in this
area are essentially identical. See also Felkenes, supra note 3, at 118; Capra, Access to
Exculpatory Evidence: Avoiding the Agurs Problems of Prosecutorial Discretion and Retro-
spective Review, 53 FORDHAM L. REV. 391 (1984). Capra argued that the Brady determi-
nation is very difficult to review on appeal because of several factors. First, there are
many pressures on the prosecutor that prevent him from looking at the evidence in his
files as potentially exculpatory. Id. at 405-06. Second, there are too many and varied
tests for the courts to apply depending on the circumstances of the request. Id. at 409-11.
Third, any review is of necessity speculative. The evidence was not admitted so the ap-
pellate court must try to determine what would have happened had the evidence been
admitted. Id. at 411-15. Capra proposed in camera judicial review of the prosecutor's
evidence prior to trial as a method of resolving many of the issues courts have confronted
in Brady's wake. Id. at 427-30.
69. See-also PROSECUTION FUNCTION, supra note 4, at 4; Miranda v. Arizona, 384
U.S. 436, reh'g denied sub nom. California v. Stewart, 385 U.S. 890 (1966), later appeal
sub nom. State v. Miranda, 104 Ariz. 174, 450 P.2d 364, cert. denied, 396 U.S. 868
(1969); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, reh'g denied, 368 U.S. 871 (1961), overruled on other
grounds, United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984); People v. Donovan, 13 N.Y.2d 148,
193 N.E.2d 628, 243 N.Y.S.2d 841 (1963).
It can not be overemphasized that our legal system is concerned as much with
the integrity of the judicial process as with the issue of guilt or innocence. The
constitutional and statutory safeguards provided for one accused of crime are to
be applied in all cases. The worst criminal, the most culpable individual, is as
much entitled to the benefit of a rule of law as the most blameless member of
society.
Donovan, 13 N.Y.2d at 153-54, 193 N.E.2d at 631, 243 N.Y.S.2d at 845. See generally
U.S. CONST. preamble, art. III, § 2, amend. IV, amend. V, amend. VI.
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potentially exculpatory evidence70 and not to do anything that inten-
tionally prejudices the defendant's rights, such as referring to evi-
dence the prosecutor knows is inadmissible.7'
III. Elements that Promote Prosecutorial Misconduct
The problem with this description 72 of the prosecutor and his role
in the criminal justice system is that it is couched in ideal terms. In
theory, the prosecutor's role is a balance between justice and ob-
taining as many convictions as possible. However, one of the easiest
ways for a prosecutor to demonstrate his effectiveness is by pointing
to his conviction statistics.73 This method of demonstrating profes-
sional competence can often overcome the countervailing pressure to
be fair.74 As a result, failure to obtain enough convictions can put the
prosecutor's career in jeopardy.7" A prosecutor is subject to the criti-
cal review of the media, the police and the victims of crimes, all of
whom, without concern for the ethical implications of his actions, are
likely to view the prosecutor more favorably if he is "tough on
crime.
' 76
Although theoretically the prosecutor's role is to balance justice
and convictions, often society's sole concern is seeing defendants con-
victed.77 , The public expects the prosecutor to prosecute; it does not
expect him to be sympathetic to the rights of defendants. 7' These
pressures to convict often breed a conviction psychology in the prose-
cutor's office; 79 the conviction psychology can generate overzealous
prosecution. A consequence of overzealous prosecution can be
prosecutorial misconduct.80
The pressure on the prosecutor that generates a "conviction psy-
chology" is not the only cause of prosecutorial misconduct. There are
flaws in the judicial system itself that encourage, or at least do little to
deter, impropriety on the part of prosecutors. One problem with the
70. See, e.g., Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963); see also supra note 67.
71. PROSECUTION FUNCTION, supra note 4, at 7, 8.
72. See supra notes 26-29, 38-42, 63-71 and accompanying text.
73. Virtuous Prosecutor, supra note 5, at 205. See also Alschuler, The Prosecutor's
Role in Plea Bargaining, 36 U. CHI. L. REv. 50, 106 (1968-69) [hereinafter Alschuler].
74. Virtuous Prosecutor, supra note 5, at 206. See also Alschuler, supra note 73, at
106 n.138.
75. Virtuous Prosecutor, supra note 5, at 205. See also Felkenes, supra note 3, at 117.
76. Virtuous Prosecutor, supra note 5, at 205 n.40. See also Felkenes, supra note 3, at
114.
77. Virtuous Prosecutor, supra note 5, at 198. See also Felkenes, supra note 3, at 118.
78. Virtuous Prosecutor, supra note 5, at 205 n.39; Felkenes, supra note 3, at 117.
79. Virtuous Prosecutor, supra note 5, at 204, 205.
80. Virtuous Prosecutor, supra note 5, at 199. See also Carey, supra note 3, at 323.
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prosecutor's position from an ethical standpoint is the identity of his
client. Model Code Ethical Consideration 5-1 states "[n]either his
personal interests, the interests of other clients, nor the desires of
third persons should be permitted to dilute his loyalty to his client.""1
The government is the prosecutor's client8 2 and the government has a
duty to govern impartially. 83 Yet given the prosecutor's role in soci-
ety, it is likely that his loyalties to third parties, such as victims, may
influence his decision-making process.8 4 No matter how impartial he
strives to be, ,these pressures on the prosecutor exist and potentially
influence his discretionary decisions. Those pressures also make it
difficult to determine when a prosecutor is striving to attain the goals
of, while not violating the tenets of, Ethical Consideration 5- 1.85
Another element that allows misconduct is the lack of definition in
the prosecutor's role.86 On the one hand, he holds a quasi-judicial
role because he is an officer of the court and therefore is required to be
impartial and to see that justice is done. 7 On the other hand, he is
also an advocate seeking a conviction, and thus an integral part of the
adversary process, which conflicts with his role as an officer of the
court.8s The conflicting nature of these dual roles makes it difficult
for a prosecutor to comply adequately with either.
In addition, a prosecutor has, tremendous discretion in terms of
case selection and the conduct of a criminal prosecution. 9 No other
person has more control over an individual's life, liberty or reputation
than the prosecutor.' ° Judges often allow prosecutors more discretion
and exert less control in criminal cases than they do in other kinds of
81. MODEL CODE, supra note 1, EC 5-1.
82. See MODEL CODE, supra note 1, EC 7-13.
83. See supra notes 63-71 and accompanying text.
84. See supra notes 72-79 and accompanying text.
85. Ethical Consideration 1-5 indicates that lawyers "should maintain high standards
of professional conduct and should encourage fellow lawyers to do likewise." MODEL
CODE, supra note 1, EC 1-5. It also indicates that "obedience to the law exemplifies
respect for law." Id. These are general ideals towards which members of the legal pro-
fession should strive. See also supra note 2.
86. Virtuous Prosecutor, supra note 5, at 201.
87. Felkenes, supra note 3, at 117.
88. Id. at 118.
89. Virtuous Prosecutor, supra note 5, at 201. See also Note, Prosecutor's Discretion,
103 U. PA. L. REV. 1057 (1955) (concluding that the prosecutor's exercise of discretion
has more impact and control over an individual's liberty and reputation than the action
of any other public official); Ganger v. Peyton, 379 F.2d 709, 713 (4th Cir. 1967); Young
v. United States ex rel. Vuitton et Fils S.A., 481 U.S. 787, 825 (1987) (Scalia, J., concur-
ring); Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 832 (1985).
90. Young v. United States ex rel. Vuitton et Fils S.A., 481 U.S. 787, 814 (1986);
ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS, supra note 63, at 2. See also Carey, supra note 3, at 321.
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litigation. 91 In addition, no other branch of government can review a
prosecutor's decision to charge someone with a crime,92 nor can the
prosecutor be forced by any branch to begin a prosecution.93 Thus,
the ambiguous nature of both the prosecutor's client and role com-
bined with the pressures to convict and the wide discretion accorded
to a prosecutor have created an environment in which misconduct can
flourish.94
A lack of clearly articulated standards of conduct to guide prosecu-
tors also fosters unethical behavior.9 Indeed, the Model Code and
the Model Rules seem only to reiterate, in broad terms, the prosecu-
tor's constitutional duties to the accused. The prosecutor, however,
already knows his constitutional obligations; he looks to the Model
Code and the Model Rules for ethical guidance in situations which do
not present constitutional issues. Unfortunately, neither provides
such guidance.
Another element within the judicial system that does little to deter
prosecutorial misconduct is the judicial reluctance to reverse convic-
tions in all but the most blatant cases of impropriety. 96 Indeed, the
91. A. GOLDSTEIN, THE PASSIVE JUDICIARY, PROSECUTORIAL DISCRETION AND
THE GUILTY PLEA 4 (1981).
92. MODEL CODE, supra note 1, DR 7-102 prohibits a lawyer from filing a suit or
taking other measures on behalf of a client when the only purpose is to harass or mali-
ciously injure another person. The prosecutor is bound by DR 7-102 when he makes his
charging decisions. He is also bound by DR 7-103(A) which requires a prosecutor not to
file a charge he knows is unsupported by probable cause.
93. Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821 (1985). See also PROSECUTION FUNCTION,
supra note 4, at 2.
94. Virtuous Prosecutor, supra note 5, at 202.
If the prosecutor is obliged to choose his cases, it follows that he can choose his
defendants .... With the law books filled with a great assortment of crimes, a
prosecutor stands a fair chance of finding at least a technical violation of some
act on the part of almost anyone . . . . It is in this realm - in which the
prosecutor picks some person whom he dislikes or desires to embarrass, or
selects some group of unpopular persons and then looks for an offense, that the
greatest danger of abuse of prosecuting power lies. It is here that law enforce-
ment becomes personal, and the real crime becomes that of being unpopular
with the predominant or governing group, being attached to the wrong political
views, or being personally obnoxious to or in the way of the prosecutor himself.
Carey, supra note 3, at 320-21 (quoting Jackson, The Federal Prosecutor, 24 J. AM. JUDI-
CATURE SOC. 18 (1940)).
95. Virtuous Prosecutor, supra note 5, at 201.
96. United States v. Young, 470 U.S. 1, 16, on remand, 758 F.2d 514 (10th Cir.), on
reconsideration, 767 F.2d 737 (10th Cir. 1985). See United States v. Modica, 663 F.2d
1173, 1178 (2d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 989 (1982); see also Virtuous Prosecutor,
supra note 5, at 201. " '[Fllagrant abuses of professional standards... seem to be occur-
ring more frequently... IT]he reasons include the fact that competitive and ambitious
prosecutors ... are emboldened to flaunt ... admonition ... by the inaction of the trial
judges who fail to stop such improper advocacy conduct in its tracks ....... 1984 ABA
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Supreme Court has shown almost total deference to the prosecutor's
exercise of discretion, conduct and judgment.9" A verbal reprimand
from a judge, without graver consequences for the prosecutor, is an
ineffective deterrent.9" In addition, judicial inaction in the face of im-
propriety "breeds a deplorably cynical attitude towards the judici-
ary."99 When misconduct enables a prosecutor to obtain convictions
he might not otherwise have gotten, and the sanctions against the mis-
conduct are virtually non-existent,10° prosecutors have an incentive to
use unethical techniques.101
The Supreme Court, when reviewing cases alleging various forms of
prosecutorial misconduct, looks at the fairness of the trial and not the
culpability of the prosecutor to determine whether a new trial should
be granted. 02 A defendant is entitled to all of the constitutional pro-
tections to ensure a fair trial. However, nothing is said about the ethi-
Standing Committee on Professional Discipline, The Judicial Response to Lawyer Miscon-
duct at 1.6 [hereinafter Judicial Response] (quoting United States v. Falk, 605 F.2d 1005,
1016 (7th Cir. 1979) (Swyger, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 903 (1980)).
97. See, e.g., Smith v. Phillips, 455 U.S. 209, on remand, 552 F. Supp. 653 (S.D.N.Y.
1982), aff'd, 717 F.2d 44 (2d Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1027 (1984); Mabry v.
Johnson, 467 U.S. 504 (1984), on remand, 752 F.2d 313 (8th Cir. 1985); United States v.
Goodwin, 457 U.S. 368, on remand, 687 F.2d 44 (4th Cir. 1982). See also Gershman,
The Burger Court and Prosecutorial Misconduct, 21 CRIM. L. BULL. 217, 225 (1985)
[hereinafter Burger Court]. Gershman argues that several themes emerge from the Bur-
ger Court's treatment of cases alleging that prosecutorial misconduct interfered with the
defendant's right to a fair trial: (1) that there has been a curtailment of the federal courts'
supervisory power to discipline and deter prosecutorial misconduct; (2) that there has
been undue deference to the Executive Branch; (3) that new procedural rules have been
implemented that make proof of prosecutorial misconduct virtually impossible; and
(4) that there has been a refusal to articulate or require ethical standards for prosecutors.
Id. at 218. See also Bd. of Educ. of N.Y. City v. Nyquist, 590 F.2d 1241, 1246 (2d Cir.
1979).
98. Burger Court, supra note 97, at 225. See also Carey, supra note 3, at 323. Carey
stated, "[t]he most that an overzealous prosecutor risks is losing a case on appeal that was
weak to begin with. And, even that risk is scarcely significant as courts, understandably
reluctant to free a guilty criminal, accept the prosecutor's pleas that the error was harm-
less." Id.
99. Judicial Response, supra note 96, at 1.6 (quoting United States v. Antonelli Fire-
works Co., 155 F.2d 631, 661 (2d Cir.) (Frank, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 329 U.S. 742,
reh'g denied, 329 U.S. 826 (1946)).
100. Two studies have been conducted reviewing cases from the last twenty-five years;
neither report uncovered an instance where the prosecutor was punished for contemptu-
ous behavior. N. DORSEN & L. FRIEDMAN, DISORDER IN THE COURT: REPORT OF THE
ASSOCIATION OF THE BAR OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK, SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON
COURTROOM CONDUCT 186 (1973). See also Burger Court, supra note 97, at 224-25.
101. Burger Court, supra note 97, at 224.
102. Smith v. Phillips, 455 U.S. 209, 219 (1982) (on habeas corpus review, the Supreme
Court reversed the Second Circuit's determination that prosecutor's failure to disclose
that one juror was actively seeking employment as an investigator with the prosecutor's
office denied the defendant due process). See also Burger Court, supra note 97, at 220.
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cal dimensions of the trial. At the very least, the prosecutor's ethical
obligations regarding his conduct are designed to coincide with a min-
imal level of constitutional protection thereby providing the defend-
ant with a fair trial.103 However, by failing to even acknowledge the
ethical issues some cases present, the Supreme Court effectively dis-
courages prosecutors from considering their conduct from an ethical
standpoint as well as a constitutional one. 1°4 Such inaction encour-
ages the prosecutor to flaunt his ethical duties, knowing that as long
as no specific constitutional right is violated, there will be no
reversal. 105
IV. Prosecutors in Civil and Criminal Trials
In many cases, courts have confronted issues arising out of a prose-
cutor's involvement in criminal and civil cases with a nexus in the
same set of facts.t°6 Although cases, for example, where the prosecu-
tor both prosecutes the defendant and represents the defendant's vic-
tim in a civil suit appear to present serious conflicts of interest for the
prosecutor,'07 the reviewing court seldom reverses the conviction or
disqualifies the prosecutor. There are other cases, however, where the
court does intervene.'08 Currently the law takes a case by case ap-
proach to these issues.
The courts that view the prosecutor's conflict as serious enough to
require reversal do so for several reasons. One important reason is to
ensure that the prosecutor exercises fair and independent discretion,
to which the defendant is entitled,'" when the prosecutor goes for-
103. See MODEL CODE, supra note 1, EC 7-21 and DR 7-103; MODEL RULES, supra
note 25, Rules 1.8, 1.11. See also supra note 68 and accompanying text.
104. Burger Court, supra note 97, at 225.
105. United States v. Young, 470 U.S. 1, 16 (prosecutor's remarks, while having no
place in the proper administration of justice, did not undermine the fundamental fairness
of the trial), on remand, 758 F.2d 514, on reconsideration, 767 F.2d 737 (10th Cir. 1985).
The prosecutor is always subject to discipline by the local bar, even if his conduct does
not rise to a level requiring reversal of the conviction. However, the threat of potential
punishment does not seem to provide a sufficient deterrent. Burger Court, supra note 97,
at 225.
106. See, e.g., Jones v. Richards, 776 F.2d 1244 (4th Cir. 1985); Ganger v. Peyton, 379
F.2d 709 (4th Cir. 1967); Hughes v. Bowers, 711 F. Supp. 1574 (N.D. Ga. 1989), aff'd,
896 F.2d 558 (1 1th Cir. 1990); Brown v. State, 242 Ga. 536, 250 S.E.2d 438 (1978).
107. See-supra notes 72-105 and accompanying text.
108. See, e.g., Ganger v. Peyton, 379 F.2d 709 (4th Cir. 1967); Hughes v. Bowers, 711
F. Supp. 1574 (N.D. Ga. 1989), aff'd, 896 F.2d 558 (11th Cir. 1990); Sinclair v. State,
278 Md. 243, 363 A.2d 468 (1976).
109. See, e.g., Young v. United States ex rel. Vuitton, 481 U.S. 787, 824-25 (1987)
(Scalia, J., concurring); Bauers v. Heisel, 361 F.2d 581, 590 (3d Cir. 1966), cert. denied,
386 U.S. 1021 (1967); United States v. Cox, 342 F.2d 167, 192 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 381
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ward with a case.110 Different groups within a prosecutor's jurisdic-
tion will have varying ideas about which cases warrant the most
active prosecution; therefore, the prosecutor should be detached from,
and impartial towards, the various elements in his jurisdiction. "' The
prosecutor's fundamental obligation is to seek justice and the only
way he can effectively do so is by being impartial towards the conflict-
ing political groups within his jurisdiction.'I 2 The prosecutor cannot
possibly prosecute every crime, and therefore he must distinguish
those that merit prosecution from those that do not." 3 Consequently,
the prosecutor decides who will be prosecuted and for what, and, in so
doing, he generally exercises a significant degree of unreviewable dis-
cretion." 4 As a result, a prosecutor who has any personal interest or
stake in the case may fail to exercise his discretion impartially.I 5
The exercise of impartial discretion in commencing a prosecution
was the Fourth Circuit's concern in Ganger v. Peyton."I6 In that case,
the attorney who prosecuted Ganger for assault also represented Mrs.
Ganger in her divorce proceeding, which was based on the same as-
sault.1 '7 Ganger testified that the prosecuting attorney had offered to
drop the criminal charges if Ganger made a favorable property settle-
ment in the divorce action.Is The court of appeals did not accept the
state's argument that Ganger had not been harmed by that which the
court considered improper conduct. 19 In trying to serve two masters,
the state and Mrs. Ganger, the prosecutor might have allowed inter-
ests other than justice to influence his decision to proceed with the
criminal case.' 20 The court held that because it did not know, and
could not ascertain, what would have happened if the prosecutor
U.S. 935 (1965); United States v. Brokaw, 60 F.Supp 100, 101 (S.D. Ill. 1945); Macon v.
Commonwealth, 187 Va. 363, 373, 46 S.E.2d 396, 401 (1948).
110. See Ganger v. Peyton, 379 F.2d 709 (4th Cir. 1967).
111. ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS, supra note 63, at 3. See also Carey, supra note 3, at
320.
112. The Model Code also imposes a duty on all lawyers to be impartial and to avoid
allowing others to influence the decision-making process. See MODEL CODE, supra note
1, Canon 5, DR 5-101.
113. Id. See also Felkenes, supra note 3, at 110.
114. See supra notes 89-94 and accompanying text; see also Carey, supra note 3, at
320; Alschuler, supra note 73, at 105.
115. The Model Code recognizes that no attorney should have or acquire any interest
in litigation in which he is involved. See MODEL CODE EC 5-3; accord MODEL RULES,
supra note 25, Rule 1.80).
116. 379 F.2d 709 (4th Cir. 1967).
117. Id. at 711.
118. Id.
119. Id. at 714.
120. Id. at 713.
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could have exercised his discretion impartially, the error could not be
deemed harmless error.' 21 As a result, the court held that Ganger's
conviction was "constitutionally invalid."'122
A prosecutor's failure to exercise his discretion impartially can lead
to a misuse of the criminal justice system. In Sinclair v. State,123 the
defendant alleged that the prosecutor had not exercised impartial
judgment in indicting him for fraud based on five bounced checks. 124
The prosecutor also represented plaintiffs to a civil suit in which Sin-
clair was the defendant. 25 Sinclair alleged that the state's attorney
had threatened to indict him if he appealed the civil case ruling; 26 the
day after Sinclair filed his appeal, the grand jury voted to indict
him. 27 Sinclair alleged that the prosecutor had abused his official po-
sition in order to gain advantage for his clients in a civil matter. 28
The Maryland Court of Appeals held that there should have been an
evidentiary hearing on Sinclair's allegations prior to the trial court's
ruling on the defendant's motion to disqualify the prosecutor.' 29 The
court enunciated the principle that a prosecutor should be disqualified
if a reasonable person would believe that the prosecutor had a finan-
cial or personal interest in the case. 30 Using criminal prosecution to
obtain an advantage in a civil matter is specifically forbidden by
Model Code DR 7-105 (1980). Yet the Sinclair court did not even
mention the Model Code of Professional Responsibility; instead, the
court based its decision on Maryland's public policy.' 3'
The Ganger court's concerns were reiterated recently in Hughes v.
Bowers, 3 2 a federal habeas corpus petition. Hughes had been con-
121. Id. at 714.
122. Id. at 711.
123. 278 Md. 243, 363 A.2d 468 (1976).
124. Id. at 246, 363 A.2d at 470.
125. Id. at 246, 363 A.2d at 470-71.
126. Id. at 247, 363 A.2d at 471.
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. Id. at 244-45, 363 A.2d at 470.
130. Id. at 255, 363 A.2d at 475.
131. Id. However, the disciplinary rules are supposed to be the litmus test of conduct
such that any conduct violative of the disciplinary rules subjects the attorney to sanc-
tions. MODEL CODE, supra note 1, Preliminary Statement. See also supra note 8.
In addition, MODEL CODE, supra note 1, EC 1-4 states, "[t]he integrity of the profes-
sion can be maintained only if conduct of lawyers in violation of the Disciplinary Rules is
brought to the attention of the proper officials." There is no indication that reference to
the proper authorities was made in the Sinclair case. The failure of lawyers and judges to
refer incidents of misconduct to the proper authorities undermines the legal system's self-
enforcement mechanisms.
132. 711 F. Supp. 1574 (N.D. Ga. 1989), aff'd, 896 F.2d 558 (1lth Cir. 1990).
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victed of manslaughter for the slaying of Murphey.'33 Hughes testi-
fied that he shot Murphey in self-defense, while the state's one eye
witness, Murphey's son, Ralph, testified that Hughes fired the first
shot. 134 Murphey's family hired a private attorney, Mitchell, to assist
the prosecution as a special attorney.135 During the trial, defense
counsel made a Brady request 36 that the prosecution turn over any
information relating to a life insurance policy on the victim and
whether any of the state's witnesses could be affected by such a pol-
icy. 1 7 The special prosecutor responded by saying, "'[t]here is noth-
ing in my file whatsoever whereby I could respond.' ",138 As a result
of this statement, the trial court denied the request,' 39 and the defend-
ant, who had no actual knowledge of any existing policies, made no
objection to the trial court's ruling."4 In fact, there was a $50,000
policy payable to Murphey's estate, but only in the event of his acci-
dental death.'41 As a result, if Murphey was the aggressor, the insur-
ance company would not pay on the claim. 142 In addition, Mitchell
knew of the policy because he had assisted the victim's wife in filing
the claim form prior to the defense counsel's request. 14 3
Based on these facts, the defendant asserted two claims in his
habeas corpus petition: first, that he was denied due process by the
prosecution's suppression of exculpatory evidence in violation of
Brady v. Maryland;' and second, that the special prosecutor had
conflicting interests as a representative of both the state and the fam-
ily.'45 The court granted the petition on both grounds.'46 The court
employed a standard that did not automatically prohibit the use of a
special prosecutor. 4 7 In order to show a violation of due process, the
court required the defendant to show either that the district attorney
failed to retain control and management of the case or that there was
specific misbehavior that prejudiced the defendant. 4 ' On the face of
133. Id. at 1576.
134. Id.
135. Id. at 1577.
136. See supra note 42 and accompanying text.
137. 711 F. Supp. at 1577.
138. Id. (quoting the trial transcript at 249).
139. 711 F. Supp. at 1577.
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. 373 U.S. 83 (1963).
145. 711 F. Supp. at 1577.
146. Id. at 1581, 1584.
147. Id. at 1583.
148. Id.
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the case, there was an appearance of impropriety and it seemed that
the special prosecutor had a pecuniary interest in the case.' 4 9 The
court did not require an actual conflict standard,' 50 but went on to say
that "an actual conflict of interest arose when the defense moved for
production of insurance policies."'' Mitchell, as special prosecutor,
had a duty to disclose the policy."5 2 But Mitchell also had a conflict-
ing interest in concealing it since, had Hughes been acquitted of man-
slaughter, the insurance proceeds would not be distributed. 53 The
court held that Mitchell's deliberate concealment of the policy from
both the defendant and the court was "a serious act of misbehavior
that disregarded the rights of the defendant."' 54
The Hughes court applied a stricter test than the Ganger court
did. 5 In Ganger, there was no affirmative, deliberate misconduct on
the part of the prosecutor. 5 6 The Ganger court was concerned that
the prosecutor's self-interest in the litigation meant that he could not
exercise independent judgment with respect to at least three areas of
official responsibility: whether he should decline to prosecute;
whether he should reduce the charge; and whether he should recom-
mend clemency, such as a suspended sentence.5 7 The Ganger court
held that the prosecuting attorney's dual representation violated the
fundamental fairness requirement of the due process clause,'
whereas Hughes required some specific misbehavior on the part of the
prosecutor before it would term the trial fundamentally unfair.'59
As the above cases suggest, the need for impartial exercise of discre-
tion and the fundamental fairness of the defendant's trial are the two
most frequently cited bases for reversals where the prosecutor's civil
and criminal obligations conflict. In addition, the more general theme
of avoiding the appearance of impropriety underlies these decisions.'6
Some courts are also concerned with the power the prosecutor pos-
sesses and the potential that he may use it for malicious ends. ' 6' Con-
149. Id. at 1584.
150. Id. at 1583.
151. Id. at 1584.
152. Id.
153. Id.
154. Id.
155. See supra notes 120-122 and accompanying text.
156. See Ganger v. Peyton, 379 F.2d 709, 714 (4th Cir. 1967).
157. Id. at 713.
158. Id. at 714.
159. Hughes v. Bowers, 711 F. Supp. 1574, 1583 (N.D. Ga. 1989), aff'd, 896 F.2d 558
(1 th Cir. 1990).
160. See, e.g., United States v. Prantil, 764 F.2d 548, 553 (9th Cir. 1985).
161. See, e.g., Carey, supra note 3, at 319-21; Felkenes, supra note 3, at 109-10.
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sistently restraining and controlling the prosecutor, therefore, is one
way to prevent such abuses of power. Not all courts agree, however,
that a prosecutor's violation of the principles discussed above 162 war-
rants an automatic reversal. Courts that take this view of the prose-
cutor's civil-criminal conflict tend to impose an arduous burden of
proof upon the defendant.
1 63
For example, in Jones v. Richards'" the court affirmed the lower
court's denial of a habeas corpus petition and found no constitutional
violation where the special prosecutor also represented the victim's
family.' 65 Jones was driving a bus which collided with a passenger
car and a child was killed in the crash. 66 The child's family hired a
private attorney to bring a civil suit and to assist in the criminal prose-
cution.1 67 At the superior court trial, the district attorney and the
private attorneys jointly prosecuted the defendant. 6 The defendant
claimed that the private prosecutor's involvement denied him a funda-
mentally fair trial with an independent prosecutor.' 69 The court de-
termined that the prosecutor made the decisions, such as whether to
seek an indictment or whether to plea bargain, which were concerns
in Ganger. 70 Thus, the court held that, although the use of private
attorneys representing the victim's family in the civil suit as special
prosecutors should not be encouraged, there was nothing in this case
that violated the defendant's rights. '
7
'
The court distinguished Ganger by relying on the control the dis-
trict attorney had over the special prosecutor. In Ganger, the state's
attorney represented Mrs. Ganger, whereas in Jones, the state's attor-
ney had no ties to the victim's family. 172 In addition, the state's attor-
ney was the one who sought the indictment and determined the
charges, not the special prosecutor.
173
However, the distinction the court draws, while practical in theory,
does not seem as strong in the Jones case as the court appears to indi-
162. See supra notes 109-59 and accompanying text.
163. Burger Court, supra note 97, at 225 (arguing that the procedural standards the
Supreme Court has established in various kinds of cases of prosecutorial misconduct
make it almost impossible for a defendant to get a new trial).
164. 776 F.2d 1244 (4th Cir. 1985).
165. Id.
166. Id
167. Id. at 1245.
168. Id.
169. Id. at 1246.
170. Id. See also supra notes 156-59 and accompanying text.
171. Id. at 1247.
172. Id. at 1246.
173. Id.
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cate. The private attorneys retained by the plaintiff represented them-
selves to the court as private prosecutors responsible for presenting
the case,174 thereby acting as co-counsel. In this capacity, they ex-
amined all of the state's witnesses and cross-examined half of the de-
fense's witnesses,' 75 and argued issues to the jury. 7 6 In addition, in
the district court's habeas corpus proceeding, the state abdicated re-
sponsibility for the hearing to the private attorneys. 77 However,
since the state was involved in the original trial, the district court
declared that the state's relinquishment to the private attorneys was
harmless error. 178
It seems that the Jones court retreated somewhat from the Ganger
standard. Although in Ganger it was only the state's attorney who
was involved, the court did not seem to limit its holding to the facts of
that case. 17  In Jones, the private attorneys acted very much like
state's attorneys and had the same kind of conflict the court addressed
in Ganger. Yet the distinction the Jones court drew between the
state's attorney and the private attorney as special prosecutor essen-
tially precluded relief for the defendant.
In Brown v. State,180 the court drew the same kind of distinction as
did the court in Jones, although with a less extensive analysis.' 8 ' The
defendant was charged with involuntary manslaughter and the vic-
tim's family hired an attorney both to represent them in a civil suit
and to assist the district attorney as special prosecutor.' 8 2 The court
held that the simple fact that the special prosecutor also represented
the family was not a ground for disqualification.' 83 The basis for this
conclusion was that the special prosecutor was subject to the district
attorney's control. 184 In the Brown case, although the court did not
explicitly state that the district attorney controlled the special prose-
cutor, the holding implies that the prosecutor was in fact subject to
the district attorney's control. There are instances, however, where
that is not the case.' 85 The Brown court, as well as the Jones court,
174. Id. at 1245.
175. Id.
176. Id.
177. Id. at 1246.
178. Id.
179. See Ganger v. Peyton, 379 F.2d 709 (4th Cir. 1967).
180. 242 Ga. 536, 250 S.E.2d 438 (1978).
181. Id. at 536, 250 S.E.2d at 439.
182. Id.
183. Id.
184. Id.
185. See infra notes 192-208 and accompanying text.
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seemed to place considerable trust in the district attorney's control
over the special prosecutor which may not, in all cases, be justified.
Commonwealth v. Dunlap,186 a per curiam affirmance of the lower
court's decision in which the dissenting justices filed an opinion, dem-
onstrates how divided courts are when dealing with these conflicts. In
that case, the district attorney who prosecuted the criminal case si-
multaneously represented the victim in a civil suit arising out of the
same violent assault.'" 7 The dissent declared that this kind of conflict
should invalidate the conviction, even if no actual prejudice had been
established.""8 In addition, the dissent stated, "[s]uch a rule is neces-
sary in light of the substantial and sensitive responsibilities and vast
discretion which are entrusted to the district attorney."'8 9 The dis-
senting justices highlighted the distinction between the prosecutor's
professional responsibility obligations and those of a private attor-
ney.' 9 They went so far as to say. that, "anytime a district attorney
represents the victim in a civil suit at the same time that he is prose-
cuting the defendant, a conflict of interest exists."' 91
The closest that any court has come to articulating a per se rule is
in Young v. United States ex rel. Vuitton,' 92 a 1987 Supreme Court
decision. In 1978, Louis Vuitton, S.A. ("Vuitton"), a French leather
goods manufacturer, brought suit against several defendants for man-
ufacturing imitation Vuitton handbags in violation of Vuitton's trade-
mark. 93 Pursuant to an out-of-court settlement, the District Court
for the Southern District of New York imposed a permanent injunc-
tion prohibiting future trademark violations.' 94 In 1983, Vuitton, sus-
pecting that the injunction was being violated, engaged the services of
a private investigation firm to initiate an undercover "sting" opera-
tion. 19 Soon thereafter, Bainton, Vuitton's attorney in the original
lawsuit, requested that the district court appoint him and his col-
league to prosecute a criminal contempt proceeding against the de-
186. 474 Pa. 155, 377 A.2d 975 (1977) (prosecuting district attorney in an assault case
also represented the victim in a civil suit based on the same assault).
187. Id. at 157, 377 A.2d at 975.
188. Id. at 156-57, 377 A.2d at 975.
189. Id. at 157, 377 A.2d at 975.
190. Id. at 158-59, 377 A.2d at 976.
191. Id. at 158-59, 377 A.2d at 976.
192. 481 U.S. 787 (1987).
193. Id. at 790.
194. The permanent injunction prohibited, inter alia, the "manufacturing, producing,
distributing, circulating, selling, offering for sale, advertising, promoting or displaying
[of] any product bearing any simulation, reproduction, counterfeit, copy, or colorable
imitation" of Vuitton's registered trademark. 481 U.S. at 790-91.
195. Id. at 791.
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fendants for violation of the injunction. 19 6 The court granted
Bainton's request,1 97 which prompted an appeal by the defendants.198
The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the appoint-
ment of Bainton to prosecute the contempt action, rejecting a claim
that his appointment deprived the defendants of their right to be pros-
ecuted by an impartial prosecutor. 199 On appeal to the United States
Supreme Court, the defendants claimed that the district court's ap-
pointment of an interested attorney was erroneous, and further, that
the district court lacked authority to appoint any private attorney as
special prosecutor. 200 Although it affirmed the authority of a court to
appoint private attorneys as special prosecutors, 201 the Court reversed
the Second Circuit's holding,202 reasoning that a district court does
not have the authority to appoint a private attorney as a special prose-
cutor in a criminal contempt action when that attorney has any inter-
est in the underlying civil litigation.203 The Young holding is
significant because of the Supreme Court's recognition that attorneys
serving two masters with conflicting interests will serve neither effec-
tively.2°4 While the holding takes steps towards a per se rule, how-
ever, it does not reach far enough.
Young focused on a unilateral decision of a federal district court to
appoint an interested private attorney as the sole special prosecutor.
The district court in Young never referred the criminal case to the
United States Attorney's Office, 5 and, in addition, appointed as spe-
cial prosecutor the very attorney who obtained the injunction. The
Supreme Court's analysis was thus largely directed at this limited in-
stance of judicial overreaching. Young does not specifically address a
situation where an existing prosecutor is involved in related civil liti-
gation, or where a private attorney is hired by a litigant to assist a
state or federal prosecutor who is already prosecuting a criminal ac-
tion.20 6 In neither of these two instances is a court in a position to
196. Id.
197. Id. at 792.
198. Id. at 793.
199. Id.
200. Id.
201. Id. at 793-96.
202. 481 U.S. 787 (1987).
203. Id. at 802 (emphasis added).
204. See id. at 803-09.
205. The United States Attorney's Office is vested with the authority to decide whether
to prosecute a criminal action. A court does have the power to initiate criminal contempt
prosecutions, but only where required by necessity borne of inaction or refusal by the
United States Attorney's Office to prosecute. Id. at 801.
206. The Young majority, in a footnote, explicitly recognized that its holding would
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exercise the type of broad decision-making that troubled the Young
Court. Cases like Ganger,207 Dunlap,2 °0 and Jones2°9 fall into this cat-
egory, and consequently, they raise issues that Young does not specifi-
cally address.
Moreover, the Court in Young based its decision on the supervisory
powers of the courts. 210 It is not a constitutionally-based decision,
and therefore does not bind state courts. The per se rule that this
Note proposes would affect both state and federal courts alike.
V. Problems with the Current Law
Prosecutorial misconduct raises serious problems for the legal pro-
fession. It undermines public confidence in the judicial system; it can
affect the defendant's constitutionally guaranteed right to a fair trial;
and it impairs the efficiency of law enforcement.21'
While some courts have reversed a conviction when confronted
with a prosecutor's civil and criminal conflicts,2"2 others have allowed
not preclude a private attorney from assisting prosecutors already involved in the crimi-
nal action:
The potential for misconduct that is created by the appointment of an inter-
ested prosecutor is not outweighed by the fact that counsel for beneficiary of the
court order may often be most familiar with the allegedly contumacious con-
duct. That familiarity may be put to use in assisting a disinterested prosecutor
in pursuing the contempt action, but cannot justify permitting counsel for the
private party to be in control of the prosecution.
Id. at 806 n.17. (emphasis in original). The Fourth Circuit has interpreted Young
similarly:
Young obviously has relevance to the issue of... authorized participation in
the prosecution of the contempt citation in this case, but it is not dispositive
because it dealt with a significantly different issue: whether a contempt prose-
cution can be turned over completely to private, interested counsel. The issue
here is whether and, if so, to what extent, private counsel for interested parties
may be authorized to participate with government counsel in such a prosecu-
tion.
Young flatly proscribes turning the prosecution completely over to private
counsel for interested parties, but it certainly did not proscribe all participation
by such counsel.
Person v. Miller, 854 F.2d 656, 662-63 (4th Cir. 1988).
207. 379 F.2d 709. See supra notes 116-22, 156-79 and accompanying text.
208. 474 Pa. 155, 377 A.2d 975 (1977). See supra notes 186-91 and accompanying
text.
209. 776 F.2d 1244 (4th Cir. 1985). See supra notes 164-79 and accompanying text.
210. 481 U.S. at 808.
211. Judicial Response, supra note 96, at 1.3. See also People v. Donovan, 13 N.Y.2d
148, 154, 193 N.E.2d 628, 631, 243 N.Y.S.2d 841, 845 (1963). "To disregard violation of
[a] rule because there is proof in the record to persuade us of a defendant's guilt would
but lead to erosion of [that] rule and endanger the rights of even those who are innocent."
Id. at 154, 193 N.E.2d at 631, 243 N.Y.S.2d at 845.
212. See supra notes 116-59 and accompanying text.
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the conviction to stand in the absence of prejudice, if the record con-
tained sufficient evidence of guilt.213 When an appellate court is
presented with this kind of prosecutorial conflict, review of the case is
complicated by two factors. First, the court is attempting to consider
the prosecutor's pretrial conduct, much of which is subject to the
prosecutor's discretion, and thus largely unreviewable. Furthermore,
there is almost no written record of the pretrial activity for the court
to review. All the court can review is the trial transcript and the tran-
script of any pretrial proceedings, but the prosecutor may have been
influenced by conflicting pressures long before the actual trial.2 14 As a
result, a reviewing court cannot determine, for example, whether the
prosecutor resisted entering into a plea bargaining agreement with the
defendant or charged the defendant' with a particularly serious offense
because of some personal animus towards the defendant unrelated to
the prosecutor's official functions.215 Second, it can be very difficult
for a reviewing court, when looking solely at the trial transcript, to
determine whether there was prejudice.216
Neither the Model Code nor the Model Rules deal effectively with
these problems that a prosecutor faces. Although the Model Rules
have an explicit provision dealing with moving between government
service and private practice, it is oriented to protecting the confi-
dences of the client's adversary.21 7 It attempts to screen former gov-
ernment attorneys so that they can return to private practice. It also
attempts to protect the government's integrity, and thus the focus is
on adverse relationships. 21  However, in cases where the prosecutor
prosecutes the defendant and represents the defendant's victim, there
213. See supra notes 164-85 and accompanying text.
214. See Carey, supra note 3, at 319-20; Sinclair v. State, 278 Md. 243, 253, 363 A.2d
468, 474 (1976).
215. See Ganger v. Peyton, 379 F.2d 709, 712 n.4 (4th Cir. 1967); Sinclair v. State, 278
Md. 243, 363 A.2d 468 (1976).
216. See Castillo v. Estelle, 504 F.2d 1243 (5th Cir. 1974) (the defendant's appointed
counsel also represented the defendant's victim in an unrelated civil litigation). While it
may be possible to recognize instances of gross professional incompetence from reading
the trial transcript alone, relying simply on the trial transcript would not reveal instances
of inadequate representation based upon the attorney's divided loyalties. Id. at 1245. See
also Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 76 (1941) ("The right to have the assistance of
counsel is too fundamental and absolute to allow courts to indulge in nice calculations as
to the amount of prejudice arising from its denial."). The problems the reviewing court
faces when evaluating these cases are similar to the problems courts confront when they
are evaluating decisions made under Brady v. Maryland. See supra note 68.
217. See MODEL RULES, supra note 25, Rule 1.11. The comment to Rule 1.11 recog-
nizes that such a provision is needed to avoid "imposing too severe a deterrent against
entering public service."
218. See MODEL RULES, supra note 25, Rule 1.11(b), (c).
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is no adverse interest. Both the government and the victim have the
same interest in seeing the guilty defendant punished. There is noth-
ing that the prosecutor learns in the course of his prosecution that is
likely to be helpful in the civil case, but the dual role gives the prose-
cutor leverage in the civil case.219 Indeed, there are relatively few pro-
visions addressed specifically to prosecutors. 22 0 Although both the
Model Code and the Model Rules unquestionably apply to all lawyers
and therefore also to prosecutors,22 1 the examples and considerations
deal overwhelmingly with problems faced by private attorneys. In ad-
dition, the provisions that are specifically tailored to prosecutors pri-
marily seem to parallel the prosecutor's constitutional duty to the
accused222 and instruct him how to behave during a trial.223 These
provisions are vague and do not provide the prosecutor with any sub-
stantive guidance.
In addition, these provisions do not deal with the conflicts between
a prosecutor's public and private responsibilities. Although both the
Model Code and the Model Rules deal with conflicts between cli-
ents,2 24 those provisions do not help the prosecutor because of the
amorphous nature of his client. 22- The Model Rules allow a client to
consent to certain conflicts, yet the prosecutor has no one to whom he
may go to obtain the necessary consent. In addition, the private client
cannot consent because he is both the source of the conflict and the
beneficiary of it. The private client is not likely to be harmed by the
conflict. The defendant, the criminal justice system and the integrity
of the profession, because of the appearance of impropriety, are what
stand to be harmed by the conflict.
This lack of guidance not only threatens the fairness of the defend-
ant's trial, and increases the potential for misuse of the criminal pro-
cess, 26 but also creates a general appearance of unfairness. One of a
219. See, e.g., supra notes 116-31 and accompanying text.
220. There are nine canons, one hundred thirty-nine ethical considerations and forty-
one disciplinary rules in the Model Code. Of these, none of the canons, two ethical con-
siderations and two disciplinary rules relate specifically to prosecutors. See MODEL
CODE, supra note 1, ECs 7-13, 7-14, DRs 7-103, 7-107.
221. Currently, it is an open question whether state disciplinary rules apply to federal
prosecutors. See United States v. Klubock, 832 F.2d 649 (1st Cir. 1987). Although some
of the cases discussed in this note were federal court decisions, they were habeas corpus
proceedings and the prosecutors in the original cases were state prosecutors.
222. MODEL RULES, supra note 25, Rule 3.8; MODEL CODE, supra note 1, EC 7-13;
see also supra note 55.
223. MODEL CODE, supra note 1, DR 7-107.
224. See, e.g., MODEL CODE, supra note 1, EC 5-3, DR 5-101; MODEL RULES, supra
note 25, Rules 1.7, 1.9. See also supra notes 43-59 and accompanying text.
225. See supra notes 65-69 and accompanying text.
226. See supra notes 123-31 and accompanying text.
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lawyer's duties is to "avoid even the appearance of professional im-
propriety. 227 Since a criminal defendant's rights are at serious risk,
the impropriety that emerges in these situations threatens the funda-
mentals of the American justice system.228
VI. A "Per Se" Rule is Needed
The risks to defendants and the criminal justice system presented
by cases where the prosecutor both prosecutes and represents the vic-
tim in a civil case cannot be allowed to continue unchecked. One
restraint that could be imposed with relative ease is a "per se" rule
barring a prosecutor from prosecuting anyone with whom he was, or
is opposing in a civil suit.
The "per se" rule would be applied as early in the prosecution as a
conflict emerged, but certainly before trial. The duty to invoke the
"per se" rule would be on both attorneys, though usually it would be
incumbent upon the prosecutor to invoke the rule because he is in the
best position to know of a past or current contact with the defendant
that poses a conflict. The defense attorney would also have a duty to
invoke the rule whenever he learned that his client had some other
contact with the prosecutor.
The "per se" rule would require knowledge of the conflict. The
"per se" rule would not apply to situations where the prosecutor was
an associate at a firm and is now prosecuting a client of his former
firm, provided he had had no contact with the client while at the firm
and did not discuss the case with any other attorneys. In such a sce-
nario, there would be no conflict because the prosecutor would
neither have, nor have had, any information that he could use to the
defendant's detriment.
There must also be a sufficiently close nexus of facts in order to
require "per se" exclusion of the prosecutor. The civil and criminal
cases would have to emerge out of the same transaction or set of facts
in order to require "per se" exclusion of the prosecutor. Otherwise, a
private attorney who decided to enter public service could find his
career severely constrained in terms of the scope of cases he would be
free to prosecute because of his prior private practice. Thus, in
Ganger v. Peyton,229 there is clearly a sufficient nexus; the same assault
227. MODEL CODE, supra note 1, Canon 9. There may be times when a lawyer's con-
duct appears unethical to the layman. MODEL CODE, supra note 1, EC 9-2. It is impor-
tant that a lawyer avoid even the appearance of impropriety that might undermine the
layman's confidence in the judicial system. Id.
228. See supra notes 209-25 and accompanying text.
229. 379 F.2d 709 (4th Cir. 1967).
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was at the heart of both the criminal and civil cases. There is also a
sufficient nexus in Sinclair v. State"23 where the same bad checks were
the basis for both the criminal prosecution and the civil suit.
Although the nexus requires the same transaction or set of facts,
the parties do not necessarily have to be the same for the "per se" rule
to apply. Thus, a prosecutor who represented the victim in a drunk
driving accident would be "per se" excluded from prosecuting the
driver. In such a situation, the concern that a prosecutor will not
exercise his discretion independently and the appearance of impropri-
ety create the same issues as in a case such as Ganger v. Peyton.231
Here again, the prosecutor would have the requisite knowledge of the
conflict thereby requiring that the "per se" rule be applied.
Although at first glance, this might seem to be similar to the sub-
stantial relationship test, the concerns are different. With the substan-
tial relationship test, the primary concern is preventing the attorney
from using one client's confidences to benefit another client.232 In the
cases where the prosecutor has a civil-criminal conflict, the concerns
are with the fundamental fairness of the defendant's trial,23 a the in-
tegrity of the judicial system234 and an appearance of impropriety. 235
The attorney is also not switching sides as in most of the substantial
relationship cases, where the attorney is taking the opposite side from
the one where he represented the first client. Instead, the attorney as
prosecutor and the attorney as civil representative to the victim is in
both cases opposing the defendant. In addition, the "per se" rule ap-
plies in more discrete situations than the substantial relationship test.
The conflicts at issue in cases where the "per se" rule would be in-
voked arise out of the same event. With the substantial relationship
test, that is not necessarily the case.236
Invoking the "per se" rule would require the prosecutor to inform
the judge of the conflict. The prosecutor should not go to the judge
on an ex parte basis, but should inform defense counsel beforehand.
The "per se" rule excluding the prosecutor does not require exclu-
sion of the prosecutor's entire office. However, it does require the
230. 278 Md. 243, 363 A.2d 468 (1976).
231. 379 F.2d 709 (4th Cir. 1967). See supra notes 116-22 and accompanying text.
232. See supra notes 44, 49-54 and accompanying text.
233. See, e.g., Ganger v. Peyton, 379 F.2d 709 (4th Cir. 1967); see also supra notes 156-
58 and accompanying text.
234. See, e.g., Sinclair v. State, 278 Md. 243, 362 A.2d 468 (1976); see also supra notes
123-31 and accompanying text.
235. See MODEL CODE, supra note 1, Canon 9; see, e.g., United States v. Prantil, 764
F.2d 548 (9th Cir. 1985).
236. See Unified Sewerage Agency v. Jelco Inc., 646 F.2d 1339 (9th Cir. 1981); see also
supra notes 56-59 and accompanying text.
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creation of a chinese wall in the office so that the prosecutor has no
contact at all with the ongoing prosecution.237 It also requires that
the new prosecutor not be exposed to any of the former prosecutor's
work product, even though the second prosecutor had no conflict. If
the second prosecutor just stepped into the former's shoes, there
would be no check on whether the former prosecutor had exercised
his discretion independently or allowed personal animus to interfere
with his decision making in deciding to prosecute the defendant. The
prosecution would still be tainted by whatever countervailing duties
of the first prosecutor.
In order for the "per se" rule to facilitate, rather than hinder, judi-
cial economy, attorneys should to be severely disciplined for failure to
comply. Where the prosecutor fails to draw attention to a conflict the
rule would have arguably covered, the conviction should automati-
cally be reversed and the case remanded for a new trial. 238 Although
an automatic reversal rule might initially seem too harsh, there are
several reasons why it is necessary to a smooth functioning of the "per
se" rule. First, it alleviates the burden of appellate review. Appellate
review of these conflicts is particularly difficult.239 Second, and per-
haps most important, is the deterrent effect achieved by the automatic
reversal rule. Given the reliance on conviction statistics as a measure
of professional competence,24 the threat of a reversal looms large in
the prosecutor's mind. However, if the reversal is not automatic,
thereby leaving open the possibility of convincing the appellate court
that the conduct was harmless error, then the "per se" rule would not
work and the courts would be left with a case by case analysis. On the
other hand, if the defense attorney failed to invoke the rule after his
client told him of his other relationship with the prosecutor, he would
be deemed to have waived his right to challenge the prosecutor's
independence.
A "per se" rule would have many advantages. First, it would cre-
ate a bright-line standard which would eliminate uncertainty while
237. United States v. Helmsley, 726 F. Supp. 929, 937 (S.D.N.Y. 1989); United States
v. Poindexter, 698 F. Supp. 300, 312-13 (D.D.C. 1988).
238. The Supreme Court has been reluctant to adopt "per se" rules of reversal. See,
e.g., Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673 (1985); United States v. Young, 470 U.S. 1,
on remand, 758 F.2d 514, on reconsideration, 767 F.2d 737 (10th Cir. 1985); United
States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648 (1984). The object of the "per se" rule advocated here is
not automatic reversal, but an automatic application of the rule when a prosecutor partic-
ipates in both the criminal and civil sides of a case. The automatic reversal of a convic-
tion for violation of the rule is to give the rule some teeth and an incentive for prosecutors
to abide by it.
239. See supra notes 212-16 and accompanying text.
240. See supra notes 73-77 and accompanying text.
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not inhibiting effective advocacy.241 A lack of clearly articulated stan-
dards can lead to prosecutorial misconduct,2 42 for a lawyer who is
unsure of his proper function and role cannot effectively administer
justice.243
Second, a "per se" rule would help protect a defendant's rights. If
the prosecutor had a part-time private practice, then he would be "per
se" excluded from any matters that involved the same facts, thus
helping to ensure that the prosecutor's discretion was being exercised
impartially. 2 " The rule would also remove any appearance of impro-
priety or conflict.
A third advantage to the "per se" rule is that it would not be overly
burdensome. The ABA's Model Rules recognize that requiring dis-
qualification of all government attorneys when one attorney has a
conflict would work undue hardship on the government. 245 The "per
se" rule would require the attorney to be effectively insulated from the
prosecution and ensure that he have no contact with those involved in
the prosecution.246
Fourth, a "per se" rule removes the opportunity for misusing the
criminal process for gains in related civil litigation. The "per se" rule
would prevent the prosecutor from indicting an opponent in a civil
241. PROSECUTION STANDARDS, supra note 6, at 6.
242. See Burger Court, supra note 97, at 225. See also supra notes 72-105 and accom-
panying text.
243. PROSECUTION STANDARDS, supra note 6, at 9. The ABA also agrees on the need
for clear standards defining the lawyer's role. MODEL CODE, supra note 1, Preliminary
Statement, at n.7 (quoting Professional Responsibility: Report of the Joint Conference, 44
A.B.A.J. 1159 (1958)).
The grounds for the lawyer's particular obligations are to be found in the nature
of his calling. The lawyer who seeks a clear understanding of his duties will be
led to reflect on the special services [the legal profession] might render if its full
capacities were realized. When the lawyer fully understands the nature of his
office, he will then discern what restraints are necessary to keep that office
wholesome and effective.
Id.
244. There are some state disciplinary rules that prohibit prosecutorial involvement on
both the criminal and civil sides of a case. See Ganger v. Peyton, 379 F.2d 709, 712 n.3
(4th Cir. 1967)(citing Virginia State Bar, Legal Ethics Comm., Ops. No. 1 (Aug. 5, 1942),
No. 32 (June 30, 1951), No. 117 (March 29, 1963), No. 121 (Jan. 11, 1963), No. 131 (Oct.
2, 1963)). However, even a clear state bar disciplinary rule did not prevent the prosecu-
tor's misconduct in Ganger.
245. MODEL RULES, supra note 25, Rule 1.10 comment.
246. The entire prosecutor's office cannot be excluded from the prosecution without
severely restricting lawyers' professional mobility. Therefore, the "per se" rule is re-
quired as an initial matter to prevent the prosecutor from ever being involved in the
prosecution of a client he formerly defended. The "per se" rule would protect both the
defendant's rights and the prosecutor's office.
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litigation. Thus, even if the prosecutor wanted to misuse the process,
he would be prevented from doing so.
A "per se" rule would be practical and easy to enforce. Judicial
reversals of convictions obtained where the "per se" rule should have
been invoked would serve to deter future misconduct by prosecutors,
since they would know that the rule would be enforced.247 Without
such rigid enforcement, the "per se" rule would do nothing to reduce
the number of prosecutorial conflicts presented on appeal.
VI. Conclusion
The judicial system, with the pressures it puts on the prosecutor,
has created a situation in which a defendant's rights are often put at
risk. A "per se" rule would resolve many of the problems with which
courts must grapple when presented with a defendant who claims
prosecutorial conflict of interest. A clear standard would benefit all in
the criminal justice system.
Kara S. Donahue
247. Judicial Response, supra note 96, at 1.6.
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